Neutrality and Cyberspace: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Reality by Neuman, Noam
  
 













Neutrality and Cyberspace: Bridging 


































Neutrality and Cyberspace: Bridging  









I. Introduction ............................................................................................. 766 
II. The Law of Neutrality – A General Overview ................................... 767 
III. The Nature of Cyberspace..................................................................... 774 
A. Intangibility .................................................................................... 774 
B. Limited Supervision and Enforcement Capabilities ................ 775 
C. A Decentralized Model of Governance .................................... 777 
IV. Applicability of the Law of Neutrality in the Cyber Domain ........... 779 
V. Experiments in Mutatis Mutandis Application ..................................... 786 
A. Possible Applications of the Law of Neutrality in           
Cyberspace ..................................................................................... 787 
B. Challenges Arising from a Mutatis Mutandis Application ...... 796 
VI. Neutrality and Cyberspace: The Way Forward .................................. 798 






*Colonel (res.), Senior Director, Law of Armed Conflict Division, Office of the Deputy 
Attorney General (International Law), Israeli Ministry of Justice. An earlier version of this 
paper was presented as part of the ESIL Kraków-Leiden Online Symposium on “Exploring 
the Frontiers of International Law in Cyberspace” held on December 4, 2020. The positions 
expressed in this article do not necessarily represent the views of the Government of Israel 
or the Ministry of Justice. The author thanks Mattan Gilboa and Yael Naggan for their 













  considerable portion of legal scholarship concerning the application of 
international law to the cyber domain has focused on cyberspace as a “fifth 
domain of warfare.”1 While the application of international law to this new 
frontier is widely acknowledged, the details regarding how it is to be imple-
mented in this domain are murky at best. Thus, discerning the lex lata in 
cyberspace is a challenging task, especially given the lack of relevant treaty 
law, and sufficient State practice and opinio juris regarding this domain. The 
challenge is further exacerbated when the legal regime in question was for-
mulated based on very particular circumstances in the physical world that 
often have no obvious equivalent in cyberspace. 
The law of neutrality, which regulates the relationship between parties to 
an international armed conflict (belligerent States) and neutral States, is one 
such regime. Gradually developed over centuries, this regime is rooted in an 
era where declarations of war were still prevalent, and the transition between 
war and peace was clear-cut. The law of neutrality was fashioned in a way 
that was highly attuned to and dependent upon the concrete attributes of the 
physical domains in which hostilities take place. As a result, the land, sea, 
and air domains are each the subject of particular neutrality rules. 
The cyber domain also has its own unique characteristics. These include 
intangibility and the lack of significant physical manifestation, limited super-
vision and enforcement capabilities over activities taking place within it, and 
deliberate decentralization as a governance model. These unique features 
present inherent challenges when seeking to apply to cyberspace existing le-
gal frameworks designed for the physical world. The law of neutrality, with 
its many domain-specific rules, is a salient example in this regard. 
This article will explore whether and how the law of neutrality may be 
applied in the cyber domain in light of these challenges. Part II provides a 
brief overview of the law of neutrality and its key provisions as set forth in 
various instruments and customary law. Part III describes in greater detail 
the characteristics of the cyber domain noted above. Part IV explores the 
question of applicability of the law of neutrality to the cyber domain and 
presents the difficulties in ascertaining the lex lata. It then turns to assessing 
the possibility of applying specific neutrality rules to cyberspace by referring 
 
1. The terms “cyber domain” and “cyberspace” will be used interchangeably through-













to analogies from other domains. In order to demonstrate what such appli-
cation may entail, Part V examines the application of neutrality rules from 
non-cyber domains, mutatis mutandis, to three scenarios describing cyber ac-
tivities in the context of an international armed conflict, and then discusses 
the legal, practical, and policy challenges that ensue. It concludes that a mu-
tatis mutandis application of neutrality rules provides, at best, a limited contri-
bution to the clarification of the legal framework. Finally, Part VI discusses 
other possible directions for bridging the gap between the law of neutrality 
and the reality of cyberspace. It specifically suggests conducting careful, 
norm-specific analyses when examining the possible applicability of rules, 
while focusing on concepts that do not inherently change from one domain 
to another. It then takes a broader perspective, pointing to the need to direct 
the spotlight back to States, taking into account their actual practice in cy-
berspace and their views on which rules they consider to be applicable as a 
matter of customary law.   
 
II. THE LAW OF NEUTRALITY – A GENERAL OVERVIEW 
 
Neutrality is considered one of the oldest and most fundamental principles 
of international law. The purpose of the law of neutrality is to regulate the 
relationship between parties to an international armed conflict (belligerent 
States) and States that are not parties to that conflict and remain impartial in 
respect thereof (neutral States).2 The law of neutrality seeks to prevent the 
involvement of neutral States in armed conflicts and to maintain friendly 
 
2. Michael Bothe, The Law of Neutrality, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HU-
MANITARIAN LAW 549 (Dieter Fleck ed., 3d ed. 2013); FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENCE 
(GERMANY), ZDV 15/2, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT MANUAL ¶ 1201 (May 1, 2013) [here-
inafter GERMAN MANUAL]; UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF 
THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT ¶ 1.42 (2004) [hereinafter UK MANUAL]. See also 2 GEORG 
SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS 











relations between the belligerents and neutral States,3 while enabling the con-
tinuation of international trade and commerce.4 In this regard, the law of 
neutrality has several underlying rationales: to protect neutral States from the 
harmful effects of armed conflict; to protect belligerent States from actions 
on the part of neutral States that would benefit their adversaries; and to dis-
courage States from participation in armed conflicts, thus preventing further 
escalation.5  
The law of neutrality is part of the legal framework applicable during 
armed conflict. As its focus is on the conduct of States, it only applies to 
international armed conflicts, i.e., between two or more States.6 The applica-
bility of the law of neutrality is determined on a factual basis for each armed 
conflict. States may declare their neutral status vis-à-vis a particular armed 
 
3. OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF 
WAR MANUAL ¶15.1.3 (rev. ed. Dec. 2016) [hereinafter U.S. DOD MANUAL]. See also Jeffrey 
T.G. Kelsey, Hacking into International Humanitarian Law: The Principles of Distinction and Neu-
trality in the Age of Cyber Warfare, 106 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 1427, 1442 (2008); Elizabeth 
Chadwick, Back to the Future: Three Civil Wars and the Law of Neutrality, 1 JOURNAL OF ARMED 
CONFLICT LAW 1, 2 (1996).  
4. As such, the law of neutrality includes particular rules relating to monitoring neutral 
trade for the purpose of preventing contraband from reaching belligerents. See generally Eliz-
abeth Chadwick, Neutrality Revisited, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT 455, 456 (Rain Liivoja & Tim McCormack eds., 2016); Bothe, supra note 2, at 
549–50, 571; Hitoshi Nasu, The Laws of Neutrality in the Interconnected World: Mapping the Future 
Scenarios, in THE FUTURE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (Matthew Waxman & Thomas Oakley 
eds.) (forthcoming 2021); 2 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE: WAR 
AND NEUTRALITY ¶ 314 (2d ed. 1912). 
5. U.S. NAVY, U.S. MARINE CORPS & U.S. COAST GUARD, NWP 1-14M/MCTP 11-
10B/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL 
OPERATIONS ¶ 7.1 (2017); Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Neutrality in Cyberspace, 2012 4th 
International Conference on Cyber Conflict 35, 37 (C. Czosseck, R. Ottis & K. Ziolkowski 
eds., 2012), https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2012/01/1_3_von_Heinegg_NeutralityInCyber-
space.pdf; AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS, ADDP 06.4, LAW OF ARMED CON-
FLICT ¶ 11.1 (2006) [hereinafter AUSTRALIAN MANUAL]. 
6. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OP-
ERATIONS 553 (Michael N. Schmitt gen. ed., 2017) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 2.0]; Bo-
the, supra note 2, at 557; UK MANUAL, supra note 2, ¶ 1.42. It should be noted that some 
are of the view that unlike the applicability of the law of international armed conflict, the 
law of neutrality would only be applicable to international armed conflicts that have reached 
a certain threshold of duration and intensity. This position is reflected in some military man-
uals as well. See U.S. DOD MANUAL, supra note 3, § 15.2.1.2; GERMAN MANUAL, supra note 











conflict,7 although neutrality can equally be deduced by virtue of a State’s 
behavior even absent such a declaration.8 Likewise, the neutral status of a 
State ceases with the end of the armed conflict, or prior to that, when that 
State becomes a party to the conflict.9   
 
7. These should be distinguished from statements of policy, such as proclamations of 
permanent neutrality, made by States, which are beyond the scope of this article. See 4 NEW 
ZEALAND DEFENCE FORCE, DM 69 (2 ed), MANUAL OF ARMED FORCES LAW: LAW OF 
ARMED CONFLICT (2019); OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL (CANADA), LAW 
OF ARMED CONFLICT AT THE OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVELS ¶¶ 1302–3 (2001) 
[hereinafter CANADIAN MANUAL]; DANISH MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, MILITARY MANUAL 
ON INTERNATIONAL LAW RELEVANT TO DANISH ARMED FORCES IN INTERNATIONAL OP-
ERATIONS 62 (2016) [hereinafter DANISH MANUAL]; U.S. DOD MANUAL, supra note 3, ¶ 
15.2.1.4; GERMAN MANUAL, supra note 2, ¶ 1203; AUSTRALIAN MANUAL, supra note 5, ¶ 
11.3; Bothe, supra note 2, at 554; David Turns, Cyber War and the Law of Neutrality, in RE-
SEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CYBERSPACE 380, 382–83 (Nicholas 
Tsagourias & Russell Buchan eds., 2015); Paul Seger, The Law of Neutrality, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 248, 259–60 (Andrew Clap-
ham & Paola Gaeta eds., 2014). 
8  . Bothe, supra note 2, at 556; CANADIAN MANUAL, supra note 7; U.S. DOD MANUAL, 
supra note 3, § 15.2.1.4; Turns, supra note 7, at 384. 
9. GERMAN MANUAL, supra note 2, ¶ 1202; Bothe, supra note 2, at 557. Importantly, 
limited breaches of the law of neutrality would generally not result in the neutral State be-
coming a belligerent nor would actions taken in defense of a State’s neutral status. See id. 
Traditionally, States were entitled to choose whether to participate in the conflict or remain 
neutral. See, e.g., SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 2, at 573. As discussed below, following 
the entry into force of the UN Charter, the law of neutrality was somewhat modified. Thus, 
the freedom to choose to participate in the conflict was significantly curtailed, as participation 
is only permitted insofar as it is taken in collective self-defense on part of a State that is the 
victim of aggression by another State. See Bothe, supra note 2, at 554. See also Chadwick, 
Neutrality Revisited, supra note 4, at 463. It is worth noting that, while controversial, some 
States consider that there is a status of “qualified neutrality,” or of non-belligerence, in order 
to describe situations whereby a State avoids participation in hostilities yet does not strictly 
adhere to the impartiality requirement. These States rely on certain State practice in this 
regard, as well as on international conventions (namely, the Third Geneva Convention of 
1949 and Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1977), which recognize the 
existence of such a status. See, e.g., U.S. DOD MANUAL, supra note 3, §§ 15.1.2.3, 15.2.2; UK 
MANUAL, supra note 2, ¶¶ 1.42.1, 1.42.3; contra Bothe, supra note 2, at 550. The use of the 
term “qualified neutrality” as it appears in the U.S. DoD Manual should be distinguished 
from an earlier use of this term, intended to signify that a State “is neutral on the whole, but 
which is obligated by pre-existing treaty obligation to afford some kind of assistance to one 
of the belligerents.” See Chadwick, Neutrality Revisited, supra note 4, at 458 n.19; 2 OPPEN-
HEIM, supra note 4, ¶ 305. Note however that in the updated commentaries to the Geneva 
Conventions, the International Committee of the Red Cross does not distinguish between 












The emergence of neutrality as a legal concept can be traced back to the 
Middle Ages,10 though its most notable articulation as an international norm 
was made by Grotius in the seventeenth century.11 In the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, when wars were still seen as permissible tools for con-
ducting international affairs, States frequently relied on their neutral status 
to keep them out of unwanted conflicts.12 It is during this period that partic-
ular neutrality rules began to take shape and were enshrined in early instru-
ments, such as the Paris Declaration of 1856.13 
The most significant codification of rules regulating the relationship be-
tween neutral and belligerent States during war, and their consequent rights 
and duties in this regard, is found in Hague Conventions V (HC-V) and XIII 
(HC-XIII) from 1907,14 which relate to the land and sea domains, respec-
tively. As for the air domain, the Hague Rules of Air Warfare were drafted 
in 1923 but were never concluded as part of a treaty by States.15 However, 
many of the rules pertaining to neutrality are considered to reflect customary 
 
See Lindsey Cameron et al., Article 4: Prisoners of War, in COMMENTARY ON THE THIRD GE-
NEVA CONVENTION 1084 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts et al. eds., 2020).    
10. 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, ¶ 286; Seger, supra note 7, at 250. Some trace the con-
cept of neutrality back to ancient times. See Simon Hornblower, Neutrality, in THE OXFORD 
CLASSICAL DICTIONARY 1011 (Simon Hornblower, Antony Spawforth & Esther Eidinow 
eds., 4th ed. 2012). 
11. 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, ¶ 287; Heinz Duchhardt, From the Peace of Westphalia to 
the Congress of Vienna, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 628, 637 (Bardo Fassbender & Anne Peters eds., 2012). 
12. Chadwick, Neutrality Revisited, supra note 4, at 456–457, 464; Turns, supra note 7, at 
380–81, 385. See also Detlev F. Vagts, The Traditional Legal Concept of Neutrality in a Changing 
Environment, 14 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 83, 85–87 (1998).  
13. Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, Apr. 16, 1856, 115 Consol. T.S. 1, 15 Mar-
tens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 1) 791, reprinted in 1 American Journal of International Law Sup-
plement 89 (1907). See 2 Oppenheim, supra note 4, ¶¶ 288–91; Bothe, supra note 2, at 551; 
Chadwick, Neutrality Revisited, supra note 4, at 458–59; Schwarzenberger, supra note 2, at 592–
93. 
14. Hague Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and 
Persons in Case of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, 205 Consol. T.S. 299 [here-
inafter HC-V]; Hague Convention (XIII) Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Pow-
ers in Naval War, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415, 205 Consol. T.S. 395 [hereinafter HC-XIII]. 
15. Commission of Jurists to Consider and Report Upon the Revision of the Rules of 
Warfare, Rules of Air Warfare art. 12, Feb. 19, 1923, reprinted in 32 American Journal of 











international law.16 The law of neutrality has thus, for the most part, been 
formulated in light of the specific characteristics of each of these domains.17  
Under the Hague Conventions, belligerents must respect the sovereign 
rights of the neutral State and, in particular, the inviolability of a neutral 
State’s territory.18 The neutral State may enforce this right, and actions to 
that effect will not be considered by the belligerents as an “unfriendly act.”19 
In the land domain, such inviolability means, for example, that belligerents 
are not allowed to move troops or convoys of munitions or supplies on the 
territory of a neutral State.20 In the air domain, belligerent military aircraft 
are forbidden from entering the jurisdiction of a neutral State,21 and the reg-
ulation of other aircraft is subject to the discretion of the neutral State.22 
Nevertheless, with regard to the sea domain, belligerent ships are allowed, 
under certain restrictions, to safely pass through the territorial waters of a 
neutral State.23  
The law of neutrality not only bestows rights upon neutral States, but 
also entails certain obligations, such as the requirement to remain impartial 
and to refrain from participating in the conflict. For example, a neutral State 
must not supply a belligerent State with ammunition or “war material of any 
kind.”24 However, a neutral State is not required to prevent the “export or 
transit” of arms or “anything which can be of use to an army or a fleet” to 
 
16. Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at Harvard University, 
Commentary to the HPCR Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile War-
fare 307, 310, 312 (2013) [hereinafter Commentary to the HPCR Manual]; UK MANUAL, 
supra note 2, ¶ 1.26.3; GERMAN MANUAL, supra note 2, ¶ 1101, DANISH MANUAL, supra note 
7, at 545. See also von Heinegg, Neutrality in Cyberspace, supra note 5, at 38 n.27; Seger, supra 
note 7, at 252. 
17. See generally Chadwick, Neutrality Revisited, supra note 4, at 459; Schwarzenberger, supra 
note 2, at 573. 
18. HC-V, supra note 14, art. 1; HC-XIII, supra note 14, art. 1. 
19. HC-XIII, supra note 14, art. 26. 
20. HC-V, supra note 14, art. 2. 
21. Hague Rules of Air Warfare, supra note 15, art. 40; Commentary to the HPCR Man-
ual, supra note 16, r. 170. 
22. Hague Rules of Air Warfare, supra note 15, arts. 12, 39. See also the commentary, id. 
at 16, 34, 36; Yoram Dinstein & Arne Willy Dahl, Oslo Manual on Select Topics of the Law 
of Armed Conflict: Rules and Commentary rr. 87–88 (2020) [hereinafter Oslo Manual Rules 
and Commentary]. 
23. HC-XIII, supra note 14, art. 10. See also Turns, supra note 7, at 387. 
24. HC-XIII, supra note 14, art. 6; Hague Rules of Air Warfare, supra note 15, art. 44. 
HC-V does not address this obligation in specific terms, however, such an obligation in the 
land domain may be deduced from the terms of Article 6 of HC-XIII (see 2 Oppenheim, 











belligerents by private entities.25 Similarly, while belligerents are prohibited 
from erecting telegraphy stations or other apparatuses on neutral territory or 
in neutral waters for the purpose of communicating with belligerent forces 
on land or sea,26 a neutral State is not required to forbid or restrict the bel-
ligerents’ use of certain forms of communication belonging to it or to private 
companies or individuals.27 Insofar as a neutral State introduces restrictions 
to either exports or communications such as those described, these re-
strictions must be applied impartially.28  
Finally, neutral States must also prevent belligerents from conducting 
hostile actions from their territory, in the land domain,29 or in their ports or 
waters, in the sea domain.30 In the air, additional unique requirements are 
imposed, such as the duty to prevent “aerial observation of the movements, 
operations or defences of one belligerent, with the intention of informing 
the other belligerent.”31 
HC-V and HC-XIII and the rules regarding the aerial domain are gener-
ally considered as still reflective of customary international law.32 However, 
the continued relevance of the law of neutrality, at least as it was formed 
more than a century ago, has been called into question.33 
Perhaps the most apparent reason for this skepticism is the establish-
ment of the United Nations (UN) in 1945, and the limits on the use of force 
imposed by its Charter.34 Under the UN Charter, States may not use force in 
their international relations unless the Security Council authorizes the use of 
force as part of collective self-defense,35 or where the use of force is in self-
 
25. HC-V, supra note 14, art. 7;  HC-XIII, supra note 14, art. 7; Hague Rules of Air 
Warfare, supra note 15, art. 45. 
26. HC-V, supra note 14, art. 3; HC-XIII, supra note 14, art. 5. 
27. HC-V, supra note 14, art. 8. 
28. Id. art. 9; HC-XIII, supra note 14, art. 9. 
29. HC-V, supra note 14, art. 5. 
30. HC-XIII, supra note 14, art. 25. Some sources also discuss a fundamental principle 
of acquiescence: if the neutral State fails to prevent breaches of the law of neutrality in its 
territory, it must acquiesce in enforcement actions taken by belligerents in response. See U.S. 
DoD Manual, supra note 3, § 15.3.2; Nasu, supra note 4, at 4. 
31. Hague Rules of Air Warfare, supra note 15, arts. 42, 47 (see additional requirements 
in Article 46). 
32. GERMAN MANUAL, supra note 2, ¶ 132; supra note 16 and references therein. See also 
U.S. DOD MANUAL, supra note 3, § 15.1.4. 
33. Bothe, supra note 2, at 552; Seger, supra note 7, at 251; Nasu, supra note 4, at 6. 
34. U.N. Charter art. 2 ¶ 4. 











defense against an armed attack.36 Thus, a Security Council resolution requir-
ing UN Member States to participate in collective self-defense efforts would 
generally override a neutral State’s impartiality obligations, while States seek-
ing to enforce a violation of neutrality are subject to the limitations imposed 
by the law on the use of force. Nevertheless, the dominant approach taken 
by States, as well as in academic writing, is that the UN Charter has not re-
scinded the law of neutrality but rather has modified it in certain aspects.37  
The development of new technologies and, in turn, the creation of new 
domains of warfare—outer space and the cyber domain38—have also led to 
compatibility questions with respect to the law of neutrality. This inevitably 
leads to the question of whether and how customary neutrality rules, devel-
oped for the land, maritime, and aerial domains, apply to these new frontiers.  
The following parts will examine the possible application of various neu-
trality rules to cyberspace. In order to do so, it is essential to understand the 
unique characteristics of the cyber domain. The next Part will, therefore, 
highlight some of them. 
 
36. Id. art. 51. 
37. UK MANUAL, supra note 2, ¶ 1.42.2; GERMAN MANUAL, supra note 2, ¶ 1204; U.S. 
DOD MANUAL, supra note 3, § 15.2.3.2; AUSTRALIAN MANUAL, supra note 5, ¶ 11.7. While 
the UK and German manuals appear to diverge regarding whether the UN Charter has 
superseded the law of neutrality, both conclude that the Charter has, at the very least, mod-
ified this body of law. See also Bothe, supra note 2, at 552–54; COMMENTARY TO THE HPCR 
MANUAL, supra note 16, r. 165; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory 
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J Rep. 226, ¶ 89 (July 8). For an in-depth exploration of this issue, see 
Chadwick, Neutrality Revisited, supra note 4. 
38. Regarding the cyber domain, see, e.g., Press Release, Warsaw Summit Communi-
qué, Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North 
Atlantic Council in Warsaw, 8–9 July 2016, ¶ 70, NATO Press Release (2016) 100 (July 9, 
2016), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm; U.S. DOD MAN-
UAL, supra note 3, § 16.1.1; U.S. Department of Defense, Summary: Cyber Strategy 2018, at 
2, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Sep/18/2002041658/-1/-1/1/CYBER_STRATEGY 
_SUMMARY_FINAL.PDF; Louise Marie Hurel, Brazil’s First National Cybersecurity Strategy: 
An Analysis of its Past, Present and Future, INTERNETGOVERNANCEPROJECT (Apr. 5, 2020), 
https://www.internetgovernance.org/2020/04/05/brazils-first-national-cybersecurity-stra 
tegy-an-analysis-of-its-past-present-and-future/. Regarding the space domain, see, e.g., UK 
Poised for Take-Off on Ambitious Defence Space Strategy with Personnel Boost (May 21, 2018), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-poised-for-take-off-on-ambitious-defence-sp 
ace-strategy-with-personnel-boost; About the United States Space Force, UNITED STATES SPACE 
FORCE (May 15, 2020), https://www.spaceforce.mil/About-Us/About-Space-Force/; 
London Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the 
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in London 3–4 December 2019, 115 NATO Press 













III. THE NATURE OF CYBERSPACE 
 
Cyberspace has come to be known as the “fifth domain” of warfare.39 While 
there are several possible definitions of cyberspace, they all have common 
elements: an information environment, which includes physical and non-
physical components, whereby data is exchanged via communication net-
works.40 This Part will briefly describe three key features of cyberspace: its 
intangibility, the limited supervision and enforcement capabilities available 
within it, and its decentralized model of governance. 
  
A. Intangibility  
 
The cyber domain is often described as intangible. While activities in the 
cyber domain are carried out through physical infrastructure in sovereign 
territories—inter alia, via computers, servers, cables, and transmitters—the 
communication of data from one computer to another, as such, lacks signif-
icant physical manifestation.41 Indeed, data is often distributed by different 
 
39. Ronald R. Fogleman, Information Operations: The Fifth Dimension of Warfare, 10 DE-
FENSE ISSUES 1 (1995), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=439942. See also Wolff 
Heinstchel von Heinegg, Territorial Sovereignty and Neutrality in Cyberspace, 89 INTERNATIONAL 
LAW STUDIES 123 (2013). However, some have questioned this characterization. See DAN-
ISH MANUAL, supra note 7, at 82. See also Sarah McCosker, Domains of Warfare, in THE OX-
FORD GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 77 (Ben Saul & Dapo Akande eds., 
2020); Dapo Akande, Antonio Coco & Talita de Souza Dias, Old Habits Die Hard: Applying 
Existing International Law in Cyberspace and Beyond, EJIL:TALK!, (Jan. 5, 2021), https:// 
www.ejiltalk.org/old-habits-die-hard-applying-existing-international-law-in-cyberspace-
and-beyond/. 
40. Tallinn Manual 2.0 defines cyberspace as “the environment formed by physical and 
non-physical components to store, modify, and exchange data using computer networks.” 
Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 6, at 564. The U.S. DoD Manual, for instance, provides the 
following definition: “[a] global domain within the information environment consisting of 
interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data, in-
cluding the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded pro-
cessors and controllers.” U.S. DoD Manual, supra note 3, § 16.1.1. The United Kingdom’s 
MI5 defines cyberspace as a “term used to describe the electronic medium of digital net-
works used to store, modify and communicate information. It includes the Internet but also 
other information systems that support businesses, infrastructure and services.” See Cyber, 
MI5, https://www.mi5.gov.uk/cyber (last visited Apr. 2, 2021). 
41. Turns, supra note 7, at 391; von Heinegg, Territorial Sovereignty and Neutrality in Cyber-












servers and service providers, scattered over various locations and jurisdic-
tions,42 while cyberspace is only the means for transmitting that data.43 To 
this extent, the physical location of the infrastructure enabling cyber activity 
is mainly of technical importance.44  
The cyber domain is, therefore, generally unaffected by territorial bound-
aries, and data can flow from one physical location to another seamlessly and 
without any delay or barriers, unlike limitations imposed on travel or trans-
portation of physical objects.45 Thus, the cyber domain is characterized by 
ubiquitous interconnectivity.46  
 
B. Limited Supervision and Enforcement Capabilities 
 
In the cyber domain, and the Internet especially, States are not the only 
prominent stakeholders and do not necessarily fully control cyber infrastruc-
ture, including that which is located in their territory.47 Accordingly, the rout-
ing of data within or between networks is not usually controlled by States 
and often does not occur in one particular central geographical location. 
Moreover, insofar as the routing of data can be traced and isolated to a par-
ticular source within the territory of a State, that State’s ability to prevent the 
 
REVIEW 521, 523 (2003). But see Laura Denardis & Mark Raimond, The Internet of Things as a 
Global Policy Frontier, 51 UC DAVIS LAW REVIEW 475, 477–78 (2017) (expressing the view 
that in recent years cyberspace has come to include many tangible objects as well). 
42. CYBERCRIME CONVENTION COMMITTEE (T-CY), CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACCESS TO 
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN THE CLOUD: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONSIDERATION BY 
THE T-CY: FINAL REPORT OF THE T-CY CLOUD EVIDENCE GROUP (2016), https:// 
www.coe.int/en/web/cybercrime/t-cy-reports (choose “TCY(2016)5” from the menu) 
[hereinafter CEG REPORT]; Jennifer Daskal, Borders and Bits, 71 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW 
179, 223 (2018); von Heinegg, Territorial Sovereignty and Neutrality in Cyberspace, supra note 39, 
at 149. 
43. Lemley, supra note 41, at 523; David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders – 
The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 1367, 1378 (1996). 
44. Daskal, supra note 42, at 180, 224. Note that in certain contexts, legal concepts have 
been introduced in order to accommodate this feature. For example, in relation to cyber-
crimes, the concept of subjective territoriality was introduced, see Jean-Baptiste Maillart, The 
Limits of Subjective Territorial Jurisdiction in the Context of Cybercrime, 19 ERA FORUM 375 (2019). 
45. Turns, supra note 7, at 398; Lemley, supra note 41, at 524; Aron Mefford, Lex Infor-
matica: Foundations of Law on the Internet, 5 INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 
211, 214 (1997); Johnson & Post, supra note 43, at 1370–71, 1378. 
46. Danielle Higson, Applying the Law of Neutrality While Transiting the Seas of Cyberspace, 6 
National Security Law Brief 1, 8 (2016). 











transmission of that data or otherwise restrict such transmission through en-
forcement mechanisms is limited by at least three factors.  
First, prevention or restriction would entail significant technological hur-
dles. For instance, data is often transmitted from one computer to another 
through multiple servers simultaneously, with the data being divided into 
numerous “packets.”48 A State may not be aware that a certain packet is part 
of a larger transmission that should be blocked or prevented.49 Even if it is 
aware of the larger communication and attempts to prevent the packet from 
traveling through its jurisdiction, such an act may prove ineffective since one 
packet may be easily re-routed through other servers.50 
Second, restrictions on data transmissions may encounter various legal 
limitations. In terms of domestic legislation, with limited extraterritorial ju-
risdictional reach, a State may be prohibited from exercising jurisdiction over 
a data packet that is merely passing through its servers.51  
Third, States may have limited capabilities to control or monitor the 
transmission of data because most of the infrastructure through which the 
information is routed is owned and operated by private entities.52 As such, 
States’ enforcement mechanisms are at times dependent on these private en-
tities providing assistance or granting access to the required information.53 
 
48. Id. at 223; Eric Talbot Jensen, Sovereignty and Neutrality in Cyber Conflict, 35 FORDHAM 
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 815, 824 (2012). 
49. von Heinegg, Territorial Sovereignty and Neutrality in Cyberspace, supra note 39, at 149. 
50. Jeffrey T. Biller & Michael N. Schmitt, Classification of Cyber Capabilities and Operations 
as Weapons, Means, or Methods of Warfare, 95 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 179, 194–95 
(2019); von Heinegg, Territorial Sovereignty and Neutrality in Cyberspace, supra note 39, at 147; 
Mefford, supra note 45, at 214. 
51. See, e.g., Daskal, supra note 42, at 220; Maillart, supra note 44, at 380–82. 
52. Daskal, supra note 42, at 181; Kristen E. Eichensehr, The Cyber-Law of Nations, 103 
GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 317, 338, 340 (2015); U.S. Government Accountability Of-
fice, GAO-10-606, United States Faces Challenges in Addressing Global Cybersecurity and 
Governance 3 (2010), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-10-606.pdf [hereinafter GAO Re-
port]. 
53. A few examples are mentioned in the CEG Report; for instance, the ability of ser-
vice providers to require government authorities to provide lawful orders directed at the 
owners of the data themselves (see CEG REPORT, supra note 42, ¶ 16, at 8), to notify cus-
tomers about investigations of their data (potentially affecting the criminal proceeding) (id. 
¶ 75, at 28), and, more generally, to determine which government request they should co-
operate with, (id. at 29). See also Jack Nicas & Katie Benner F.B.I. Asks Apple to Help Unlock 
Two iPhones, NEW YORK TIMES (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/ 
07/technology/apple-fbi-iphone-encryption.html; Leander Kahney, The FBI Wanted a Back 












Furthermore, in cases where data is encrypted, States would have to acquire 
invasive technical capabilities in order to ascertain the origin, destination, 
and purpose of the transmission.54 
This is not to say that there are no attempts to regulate certain cyber 
activities at the domestic level. Privacy protection regulations are but one 
example of rules that may limit or restrict the flow of information.55 Addi-
tionally, States are more inclined to exercise jurisdiction over data transmis-
sions when it pertains to their national security or their law enforcement ef-
forts, for example, by issuing search warrants to Internet service providers 
and platforms.56 Yet even such efforts are, at times, subject to criticism,57 
and the legal contours regarding remote access warrants are still being dis-
cussed by the international community.58 Therefore, the ability of States to 
supervise or enforce cyber activities may, for the most part, be of very limited 
effect. 
  
C. A Decentralized Model of Governance 
 
International governance of cyberspace and the Internet, in particular, has 
developed rather organically in a decentralized manner, with multiple stake-
holders taking part in shaping standards, protocols, and norms. This unique 
model of governance is not the product of a formal decision by a particular 
 
54. See, e.g., CEG Report, supra note 42, ¶ 41, at 15; Tim Maurer & Garrett Hinck, The 
Trump Administration Wants to be Able to Break into Your Encrypted Data. Here’s What You Need 
to Know, WASHINGTON POST (July 29, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/poli-
tics/2019/07/29/trump-administration-wants-be-able-break-into-your-encrypted-data-he-
res-what-you-need-know/. 
55. For example, the European Union enacted the General Data Protection Regulation 
to guarantee “fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons and in particular their 
right to the protection of personal data.” See Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 27 April 2016, on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard 
to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of such Data, and Repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 32, art 1, ¶ (2). See also Daskal, supra note 42, at 209. 
56. Daskal, supra note 42, at 205. 
57. Such criticism may relate to effects on innovation and competitiveness. See, e.g., 
Nicholas Martin et al., How Data Protection Regulation Affects Startup Innovation, 21 INFOR-
MATION SYSTEMS FRONTIERS 1307, 1308 (2019). Or it may relate to infringement of human 
rights. See, e.g., Daskal, supra note 42, at 185-187.  
58. For a discussion on formulating a second additional protocol to the Budapest Con-
vention on Cybercrime, see, e.g., Enhanced International Cooperation on Cybercrime and Electronic 
Evidence: Towards a Protocol to the Budapest Convention, Council of Europe (Sept. 5, 
2019), https://rm.coe.int/summary-towards-a-protocol-to-the-budapest-conven-











State or the international community as a whole—it is the product of dec-
ades of evolution and adaptation by governments, standard-setting organi-
zations, and the private sector. The result is that no single body can exert 
control over cyberspace in its entirety. Instead, the Internet is governed 
through a multitude of organizations, standard-making bodies,59 and private 
entities,60 alongside domestic governance organizations.  
For many States, decentralization is not only an accurate description of 
the Internet in its current form but rather a desirable model of governance.61 
For those States, this model, based on limited government interference, gen-
 
59. These include the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN), which is responsible for development of policies related to the global Internet 
system, domain registration, and DNS; the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), which 
is “a large open international community of network designers, operators, vendors, and re-
searchers concerned with the evolution of Internet architecture and the smooth operation 
of the Internet,” which works through various working groups; the World Wide Web Con-
sortium (W3C) that develops certain Internet standards; and other Internet service provid-
ers. In standard-setting bodies such as ICANN and the IETF, the decision-making process 
involves the input of many stakeholders, and governments do not wield decisive authority. 
See generally Laura DeNardis, The Emerging Field of Internet Governance, in THE OXFORD HAND-
BOOK OF INTERNET STUDIES 555, 558–63 (William H. Dutton, ed., 2013); About, IETF, 
https://www.ietf.org/about/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2021). 
60. Daskal, supra note 42, at 235–37. For example, see Policy Paper: A Digital Geneva 
Convention to Protect Cyberspace in Times of Peace, Microsoft, https://www.microsoft.com/en-
us/cybersecurity/content-hub/a-digital-geneva-convention-to-protect-cyberspace (last vis-
ited Apr. 2, 2021). 
61. For reports on the positions of the United States and Germany, see Adam Segal, 
Holding the Multistakeholder Line at the ITU: The U.S. Perspective, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS (Oct. 21, 2014), https://www.cfr.org/report/holding-multistakeholder-line-itu; Jo-
hannes Thimm & Christian Schaller, Internet Governance and the ITU: Maintaining the Multistake-
holder Approach: The German Perspective, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Oct. 22, 2014), 
https://www.cfr.org/report/internet-governance-and-itu-maintaining-multistakeholder-











erally fosters innovation and growth and enables greater freedom of expres-
sion.62 It should be noted, however, that some States do not necessarily sub-
scribe to this model.63 
With these characteristics in mind, the following parts will explore the 
applicability of the law of neutrality to the cyber domain. 
 
IV. APPLICABILITY OF THE LAW OF NEUTRALITY                                         
IN THE CYBER DOMAIN 
 
As noted earlier, the law of neutrality gradually developed to address legal 
issues arising in particular contexts. Accordingly, many of its rules relate spe-
cifically to the domain for which they were created. Against this backdrop, 
this Part will focus on the question of whether the law of neutrality—or par-
ticular norms therein—can be applied in the cyber domain. 
The common view held by the vast majority of States is that international 
law generally applies to cyberspace.64 This approach is also evident in the 
 
62. DeNardis, supra note 59, at 568–69. See also, e.g., WHITE HOUSE, INTERNATIONAL 
STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE: PROSPERITY, SECURITY, AND OPENNESS IN A NETWORKED 
WORLD (2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/in-
ternational_strategy_for_cyberspace.pdf; 2 GLOBAL COMMISSION ON INTERNET GOVERN-
ANCE, WHO RUNS THE INTERNET?: THE GLOBAL MULTI-STAKEHOLDER MODEL OF IN-
TERNET GOVERNANCE (2016), https://www.cigionline.org/publications/who-runs-inter-
net-global-multi-stakeholder-model-internet-governance. 
63. Specifically, in recent years there have been attempts by China and Russia to expand 
the mandate of the International Telecommunications Union in order to empower this body 
to have a greater role in Internet governance; efforts that have been rejected and subjected 
to criticism by States such as the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Estonia, and 
the Netherlands. See, e.g., Samuele De Tomas Colatin, A Surprising Turn of Events: UN Creates 
Two Working Groups on Cyberspace, CCDCOE, https://ccdcoe.org/incyder-articles/a-surpris-
ing-turn-of-events-un-creates-two-working-groups-on-cyberspace/ (last visited Apr. 2, 
2021). 
64. For the positions of individual States, see, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, 
U.S. Department of State, Remarks at the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference: 
International Law in Cyberspace (Sept. 18, 2012), reprinted in 54 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL 
LAW JOURNAL 7 (2012), https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/197924.htm; 
Jeremy Wright, UK Attorney General, Keynote Address at the Chatham House Royal In-
stitute for International Affairs: Cyber and International Law on the 21st Century, Gov.UK 
(May 23, 2018), https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/cyber-and-international-law-
in-the-21st-century [hereinafter UK Attorney General]; Eesti Vabariigi, President, Republic 













ongoing discussions of the UN Governmental Group of Experts (GGE), 
during which, in 2013, States recognized that “[i]nternational law, and in par-
ticular the Charter of the United Nations, is applicable and is essential to 
maintaining peace and stability and promoting an open, secure, peaceful and 
accessible ICT environment”—an approach that was reaffirmed in 2015.65 
While some States have expressed strong opposition to the applicability 
of the law of armed conflict (LOAC) to cyberspace,66 the prevalent view is 
 
at-the-opening-of-cycon-2019/index.html; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of the 
Netherlands, Letter to the President of the House of Representatives on the International 
Legal Order in Cyberspace, app., International Law in Cyberspace 5 (July 5, 2019), 
https://www.government.nl/ministries/ministry-of-foreign-affairs/documents/parlia-
mentary-documents/2019/09/26/letter-to-the-parliament-on-the-international-legal-or-
der-in-cyberspace [hereinafter The Netherlands, International Law in Cyberspace]; Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s International 
Cyber Engagement Strategy, Annex A: Australia’s Position on how International Law Ap-
plies to State Conduct in Cyberspace (2017), https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/inter-
national-relations/international-cyber-engagement-strategy/aices/chapters/annexes.html 
[hereinafter Australia’s Position on how International Law Applies to State Conduct in Cy-
berspace]; Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Government of New Zealand, The Ap-
plication of International Law to State Activity and Cyberspace ¶ 25 (2020), 
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Peace-Rights-and-Security/International-security/Inter-
national-Cyber-statement.pdf; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Finland, Inter-
national Law and Cyberspace: Finland’s National Positions 7 (2020), https://um.fi/docu-
ments/35732/0/KyberkannatPDF_EN.pdf/12bbbbde-623b-9f86-b254-07d5af3c6d85?t= 
1603097522727. See also Roy S. Schöndorf, Israel’s Perspective on Key Legal and Practical Issues 
Concerning the Application of International Law to Cyber Operations, 97 INTERNATIONAL LAW 
STUDIES 395 (2021). NATO members have adopted cyber operations doctrine. See North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, AJP-3.20 (ed. A, v. 1), Allied Joint Doctrine for Cyberspace 
Operations (2020), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/allied-joint-doctrine-
for-cyberspace-operations-ajp-320. 
65. Rep. of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of 
Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, ¶ 19, U.N. 
Doc. A/68/98 (June 24, 2013); Rep. of the Group of Governmental Experts on Develop-
ments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International 
Security ¶¶ 24–28, U.N. Doc. A/70/174 (July 22, 2015); G.A. Res. 70/237 (Dec. 30, 2015) 
[hereinafter 2015 GGE Report] (the 2015 report was adopted by consensus). 
66. Following the 2015 GGE Report, some States expressed a strong opposition to the 
applicability of LOAC in the cyber context. This was, in fact, one of the grounds for the 
failure to reach a consensus report in the 2017 meeting of this forum. See, e.g., The Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Response of the Special Representative of the 
President of the Russian Federation for International Cooperation on Information Security 












that this regime applies as well.67 This discourse notwithstanding, specific 
references to the applicability of the law of neutrality, as such, to cyberspace, 
 
This Sphere (June 29, 2017), https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_pub-
lisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2804288; Michael Rodríguez, Representative Of 
Cuba, Declaration at the Final Session Of Group Of Governmental Experts on Develop-
ments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International 
Security, JUST SECURITY, (June 23, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2017/06/Cuban-Expert-Declaration.pdf; De Tomas Colatin, supra note 63; Michael 
Schmitt & Liis Vihul, International Cyber Law Politicized: The UN GGE’s Failure to Advance Cyber 
Norm, JUST SECURITY (June 30, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/42768/international-
cyber-law-politicized-gges-failure-advance-cyber-norms/; Michael Schmitt, Norm-Skepticism 
in Cyberspace? Counter-Factual and Counterproductive, JUST SECURITY, (Feb. 28, 2020), https:// 
www.justsecurity.org/68892/norm-skepticism-in-cyberspace-counter-factual-and-counter-
productive/. 
67. The Netherlands, International Law in Cyberspace, supra note 64; Brian J. Egan, 
International Law and Stability in Cyberspace, 35 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
169 (2017), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/BJIL-article-In-
ternational-Law-and-Stability-in-Cyberspace.pdf; UK Attorney General, supra note 64; MIN-
ISTÈRE DES ARMÉES DE FRANCE, DROIT INTERNATIONAL APPLIQUÉ AUX OPÉRATIONS 
DANS LE CYBERSPACE [MINISTRY OF THE ARMIES OF FRANCE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AP-
PLIED TO OPERATIONS IN CYBERSPACE] 12–16 (2019), https://www.defense.gouv.fr/con-
tent/download/567648/9770527/file/international +law+applied+to+operations+in+cy-
berspace.pdf [hereinafter MINISTRY OF THE ARMIES OF FRANCE ]; Australia’s Position on 
how International Law Applies to State Conduct in Cyberspace, supra note 64; Schöndorf, 
supra note 64, at 399; Duncan B. Hollis, Improving Transparency – International Law and 
State Cyber Operations: Fourth Report ¶¶ 19–20, CJI/doc. 603/20 rev.1 corr.1 (Mar. 5, 
2020), http://www.oas.org/en/sla/iajc/docs/CJI_doc_603-20_rev1_corr1_eng.pdf (indi-
cating that Chile and Bolivia are also of this view). The 2015 GGE Report does not address 
LOAC applicability as such, though it does apply basic principles of LOAC to cyberspace. 
See 2015 GGE Report, supra note 65, ¶ 28(d). Some have noted that regardless of the matter 
of applicability, there remains the question of how these rules are to be applied in cyber-
space. See, e.g., UK Attorney General, supra note 64; Schöndorf, supra note 64, at 398. See also 











remain quite limited.68 Thus, the question of whether and how this legal re-
gime can be applied in cyberspace has yet to be concretely determined.69 
As indicated above, the main treaties setting forth the law of neutrality, 
HC-V and HC-XIII, deal with specific domains: HC-V regulates the “Rights 
and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land” and HC- 
XIII deals with “Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War.”70 Quite 
apart from their domain-specific nature, it is also understandable that treaties 
drafted at the beginning of the twentieth century do not refer to the cyber 
domain. Therefore, since they are not applicable as such, we must turn to 
examine whether parts of these instruments reflect applicable rules of cus-
tomary international law.  
As is well known, under international law the identification of a custom-
ary rule and its precise content requires an examination of whether there is 
State practice accompanied by opinio juris supporting the existence of such a 
 
68. The Netherlands, Denmark and France are notable exceptions. See The Nether-
lands, International Law in Cyberspace, supra note 64, at 5; DANISH MANUAL, supra note 7, 
at 60; MINISTRY OF THE ARMIES OF FRANCE, supra note 67, at 16. See also U.S. DOD MAN-
UAL, supra note 3, § 16.4. The Commentary to the Oslo Manual is instructive in this regard, 
noting that:  
 
[i]t is unclear whether and to what extent the law of neutrality applies in the cyber 
context. Divergent views exist with respect to this question. Some States believe that the 
raison d’être of the law of neutrality, and its reliance on the concept of neutral territory, is 
inconsistent with the characteristics of cyber activities. Others, on the other hand, argue 
that the law of neutrality may be applied in the cyber context mutatis mutandis.  
 
OSLO MANUAL RULES AND COMMENTARY, supra note 22, at 25. 
69. Eichensehr, The Cyber-Law of Nations, supra note 52, at 377. See generally, Michael N. 
Schmitt, Taming the Lawless Void: Tracking the Evolution of International Law Rules for Cyberspace, 
3 TEXAS NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEW 32, 36 (2020), https://tnsr.org/2020/07/taming-
the-lawless-void-tracking-the-evolution-of-international-law-rules-for-cyberspace/. 
70. The titles of Hague Convention V and XIII, respectively (emphasis added). Note, 
however, that each of these treaties contains provisions which affect the other domain as 
well. See, e.g., HC-V, supra note 14, arts. 3, 7; HC-XIII, supra note 14, art. 5. See also Turns, 











rule.71 State practice is understood to mean sufficient, widespread, and con-
sistent practice by States.72 Opinio juris means that the State has undertaken 
the practice with a sense of legal right or obligation.73  
Accordingly, the identification of customary neutrality rules relating to 
the cyber domain would require examining whether there is sufficient, wide-
spread, and consistent State practice accompanied by opinio juris relating spe-
cifically to the applicability and substance of the law of neutrality to cyber-
space.74 Importantly, such identification of custom must be based on State 
practice that is closely related to the practice under examination in the cyber 
domain,75 and the opinio juris regarding such rules must not be domain-spe-
cific.76 
In respect of State practice, to the best of this author’s knowledge, so far 
there have been no explicit cases in which States claimed their neutral status 
had been violated by belligerents as a result of cyber-attacks or cyber opera-
 
71. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 
Rep. 3, ¶ 77 (Feb. 20); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. 
v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 207 (June 27); Jurisdictional Immunities of the 
State (Ger. v. It.; Greece Intervening), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 99, ¶ 55 (Feb. 3). See also 
Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Seventieth Session, U.N. Doc. A/73/10, at 125 
(2018) [hereinafter ILC CIL Report]. 
72. Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), Judgment, 1950 I.C.J. Rep. 266, 277 (Nov. 20); North Sea 
Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (Nov. 20).  
73. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 28 (Sept. 7); 
North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶¶ 77–78.  
74. See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt & Sean Watts, The Decline of International Humanitarian 
Law Opinio Juris and the Law of Cyber Warfare, 50 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 
189, 231 (2015) (stressing that “State expressions of opinio juris take on added importance as 
cyber capabilities are developed and fielded” in light of the fact that existing IHL treaty and 
customary rules were not crafted or crystallized with cyber operations in mind”); Seger, supra 
note 7, at 252–53. 
75. See, e.g., S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 21, 26–27; North Sea Continental 
Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 79.   
76. See, e.g., Frans G. von der Dunk, Armed Conflicts in Outer Space: Which Law Applies?, 
97 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 188, 207 (2021) (while discussing the domain of outer-
space, it seems that the author considers this approach to be generally applicable when dis-
cussing emerging domains of warfare). However, some object to the position whereby ap-
plicability of legal rules to cyberspace hinges on their domain-specificity. See Akande, Coco 











tions, or where belligerents claimed that a neutral State breached its obliga-
tions under the law of neutrality in the cyber domain.77 Statements made by 
States regarding the routing of such attacks through their neutral territory 
seem to be even scarcer—despite the fact that due to the architecture of 
cyberspace, such attacks are most likely routed through servers in neutral 
territory.78  
In terms of opinio juris, as noted above, States have generally expressed 
their openness towards the application of international law in the cyber do-
main.79 However, the number of States that explicitly voiced their support 
for applying the law of neutrality to the cyber domain remains limited.80 Even 
among those States who support this application, some have considered it 
to be narrow in scope, referring to particular rules and circumstances,81 while 
others provided only limited guidance on how specific neutrality rules should 
be implemented.82 Therefore, even among States that support the applica-
tion of the law of neutrality to the cyber domain, what such application pur-
portedly entails is murky, at best. 
Consequently, there appears to be insufficient State practice and opinio 
juris to determine that the law of neutrality as a whole, or particular neutrality 
rules, necessarily apply to the cyber domain as a matter of custom.83 For 
some, this conclusion may not be without difficulty, as it may appear to imply 
 
77. DANISH MANUAL, supra note 7, at 60; Turns, supra note 7, at 382, 391–92. See also 
Dan Efrony & Yuval Shany, A Rule Book on the Shelf? Tallinn Manual 2.0 on Cyberoperations 
and Subsequent State Practice, 112 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 583, 
595 (2018); Hollis, supra note 67, ¶ 4. 
78. It is worth noting that one possible reason for this lack of practice may be the 
limited instances where cyber-attacks or cyber operations were publicly acknowledged and 
attributed to a particular belligerent State. See, e.g., Efroni & Shany, supra note 77, at 586; von 
Heinegg, Territorial Sovereignty and Neutrality in Cyberspace, supra note 39, at 139; Kristen E. 
Eichensehr, The Law and Politics of Cyberattack Attribution, 67 UCLA LAW REVIEW 520, 523 –
24 (2020); Hollis, supra note 67, ¶ 3; Schmitt, Taming the Lawless Void, supra note 69, at 36. 
But see HARRIET MOYNIHAN, CHATHAM HOUSE, THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW TO STATE CYBERATTACKS: SOVEREIGNTY AND NON-INTERVENTION ¶ 4 (2019),  
https://www.chathamhouse.org/2019/12/application-international-law-state-cyberat-
tacks. 
79. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
80. See supra note 68. 
81. U.S. DOD MANUAL, supra note 3, § 16.4.1.  
82. See, e.g., DANISH MANUAL, supra note 7, at 60; The Netherlands, International Law 
in Cyberspace, supra note 64. 
83. The Oslo Manual reaches a similar conclusion, See OSLO MANUAL RULES AND COM-











that there is a “legal void” in this respect. Indeed, certain States have ex-
pressed their aversion to such a result when it comes to international law 
more generally. The UK Attorney General, for instance, stated that: “Cyber 
space is not—and must never be—a lawless world. It is the UK’s view that 
when states and individuals engage in hostile cyber operations, they are gov-
erned by law just like activities in any other domain.”84 
This concern may also rest on practical grounds, given that the formula-
tion of new specific treaties concerning the cyber domain does not seem 
feasible (and at least for some, not necessarily desirable) in the near future in 
light of the current global political climate and the rapid and continuous 
technological developments in this field.85  
These apprehensions may have been a catalyst for a prominent approach 
featured in current legal discourse, which takes the general willingness to 
apply international law to cyberspace a step further and assumes that the law 
of neutrality, or particular neutrality rules, can apply to cyberspace by anal-
ogy.86 Such was the approach, for instance, taken by the experts in Tallinn 
Manual 2.0.87 It is also reflective of the approach taken, to some extent, in 
 
84. UK Attorney General, supra note 64. See, similarly, the position expressed by the 
Australian Foreign Minister: “[t]he activities of states in cyberspace have implications for us 
all. Cyberspace is not an ungoverned space. Just like in the physical domains, states have 
rights but they also have obligations.” DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, 
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, AUSTRALIA’S INTERNATIONAL CYBER ENGAGEMENT 
STRATEGY 6 (2017), https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/DFAT%20AICES_Ac-
cPDF.pdf. See also Schmitt, Taming the Lawless Void, supra note 69; Harold Hongju Koh, Key-
note Address: The Emerging Law of 21st Century War, 66 EMORY LAW JOURNAL 487, 489–90, 
504 (2017); Dapo Akande, Duncan B. Hollis, Harold Hongju Koh & James C. O’Brien, 
Oxford Statement on the International Law Protections against Cyber Operations Targeting the Health-
Care Sector, OPINIO JURIS (May 21, 2020), https://opiniojuris.org/2020/05/21/oxford-
statement-on-the-international-law-protections-against-cyber-operations-targeting-the-
health-care-sector/. 
85. See Higson, supra note 46, at 4, 25–26; Eichensehr, The Cyber-Law of Nations, supra 
note 52, at 320–21, 330–35; Duncan B. Hollis, Ben Vila & Daniela Rakhlina-Powsner, Elab-
orating International Law for Cyberspace, DIRECTIONS CYBER DIGITAL EUROPE (July 29, 2020), 
https://directionsblog.eu/elaborating-international-law-for-cyberspace/; Schmitt, Taming 
the Lawless Void, supra note 69, at 35. See also von Heinegg, Territorial Sovereignty and Neutrality 
in Cyberspace, supra note 39, at 123; McCosker, supra note 39, at 98. For an earlier reflection 
of this approach, based on these practical grounds, see George Walker, Neutrality and Infor-
mation Warfare, 76 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 233, 247 (2002). 
86. Biller & Schmitt, supra note 50, at 180–81; McCosker, supra note 39, at 93, 97–98.  











the HPCR Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare88 
and in several academic publications.89  
While this approach is understandably appealing, it is important to bear 
in mind that the use of analogies in international law is not without its limi-
tations.90 Indeed, even its proponents recognize that its application requires 
a prudent case-by-case examination.91 Nevertheless, the unique characteris-
tics of the cyber domain, and the fact that the law of neutrality was developed 
based on situations arising in the physical world (where notions of borders 
and control are much more clear-cut), bring to the fore certain inherent ten-
sions, and thus, fundamental constraints on the ability to draw analogies. 
Therefore, attempts to examine the application of neutrality rules by drawing 
analogies from other domains of warfare, mutatis mutandis, may prove to be 
not only a demanding task, but an unsatisfying one as well. The following 
Part will illustrate this by presenting several theoretical scenarios of cyber 
military operations, while attempting to apply specific neutrality rules to 
them. 
 
V. EXPERIMENTS IN MUTATIS MUTANDIS APPLICATION 
 
This Part will analyze three examples discussing various aspects relating to 
military cyber operations conducted during and as part of an international 
armed conflict. For each scenario, the possible application of certain neutral-
ity rules, mutatis mutandis, will be explored. The following scenarios will be 
addressed: (a) a cyber-attack transmitted through servers located in a neutral 
 
88. COMMENTARY TO THE HPCR MANUAL, supra note 16, at 309. 
89. Biller & Schmitt, supra note 50, at 191–95; Higson, supra note 46, at 28–29; Turns, 
supra note 7, at 392, 396-399; Kelsey, supra note 3, at 1444; Walker, supra note 85, at 245–46. 
See also Eichensehr, The Cyber-Law of Nations, supra note 52, at 335-40.  
90. This article will not dwell on the theoretical aspects of drawing analogies in inter-
national law. Suffice to say that the use of analogies is subject to various substantive and 
methodological limitations, and as such necessarily warrants a cautious approach. See, e.g., 
Sandesh Sivakumaran, Techniques in International Law-Making: Extrapolation, Analogy, Form and 
the Emergence of an International Law of Disaster, 28 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 1097, 1117–1121, especially 1120–22 (2017); Fernando Lusa Bordin, Analogy, in CON-
CEPTS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONTRIBUTIONS TO DISCIPLINARY THOUGHT 25, 36–
37 (Jean d’Aspermont & Sahib Singh eds., 2019). See also Reparation for Injuries Suffered in 
the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J Rep. 174, 211 (April 11) 
(dissenting opinion by Pasha, J.). 
91. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 6, at 554; Biller & Schmitt, supra note 50, at 182; 
Turns, supra note 7, at 386; Jensen, supra note 48, at 816, 824; See also Eichensehr, The Cyber-











State; (b) a neutral State relaying information regarding an impending cyber-
attack as part of a computer emergency response team (CERT) network; and 
(c) the operation, by private corporations, of online services that block cyber-
attacks from the territory of neutral States. Each analysis will attempt to ap-
ply neutrality rules that may be relevant to the scenario and discuss the pos-
sible implications and complexities that may arise. Scenario (a) will focus on 
the obligations incumbent on the belligerent States, scenarios (b) and (c) will 
focus on the obligations of the neutral State. Based on this analysis, the Part 
will then address challenges to the application of the law of neutrality to cy-
berspace by analogy that were identified as common to the various scenarios. 
 
A.  Possible Applications of the Law of Neutrality in Cyberspace 
 
1. Cyber-attack via Servers in a Neutral State 
 
States A and B are belligerent parties in an international armed conflict. Dur-
ing the course of hostilities, State A conducts a cyber-attack against State B 
by transmitting malware via servers located in the territory of neutral State 
C. The attack causes physical damage to cyber infrastructure in State B.92  
This example appears relatively straightforward. As discussed above, un-
der the law of neutrality, the inviolability of the territory of a neutral State 
must be upheld by belligerents.93 Specifically, Articles 1 and 2 of HC-V ad-
dressing the land domain prohibit the belligerent State from moving “troops 
or convoys of either munitions of war or supplies” across that territory.94 
Under this scenario, one might equate the transmission of malware through 
computer servers with the “movement of troops or munitions of war,”95 and 
 
92. While the prevailing view is that cyber-attacks with results similar to those of kinetic 
attacks (i.e., causing death, injury, or physical damage or destruction to objects) trigger the 
LOAC rules of distinction, precautions, and proportionality, there is an ongoing debate 
whether cyber operations that do not directly involve physical damage, such as loss of func-
tionality, trigger these rules. See, e.g., U.S. DOD MANUAL, supra note 3, § 16.2.1; TALLINN 
MANUAL 2.0, supra note 6, at 415–20; Biller & Schmitt, supra note 50, at 203–4. Thus, and 
for the sake of simplifying the example, it is assumed that the attack involves physical harm 
or destruction. 
93. HC-V, supra note 14, arts. 1–2. 
94. Id. art. 2. 
95. See, e.g., Kelsey, supra note 3, at 1443–44. There is an ongoing debate whether mal-
ware or any other malicious code can be regarded as a “weapon” or as “munitions of war.” 












thus argue that such transmission, when conducted as part of a cyber-attack 
through the territory of a neutral State, would violate State C’s territory, and 
is therefore prohibited by the law of neutrality.  
However, the examination of the relevant neutrality rules concerning the 
sea domain might lead to a different conclusion, since Article 10 of HC-XIII 
states that the “neutrality of a Power is not affected by the mere passage 
through its territorial waters of war-ships or prizes belonging to belliger-
ents.”96 Applying this rule to our scenario by analogy may result in equating 
the malware used for the attack with warships (which can similarly be used 
for attacks).97 Under this analysis, the transmission of malware that forms 
the basis of the cyber-attack may be considered as “mere passage” through 
the territorial waters of a neutral State, and therefore permissible.   
Consequently, there seems to be a conflict between the different do-
main-based neutrality rules that pertain to what are, prima facie, similar is-
sues.98 This is understandable as the law of neutrality applicable to land was 
developed to protect the physical borders and territories of States,99 whereas 
the law of neutrality applicable to the sea was developed distinctly for unique 
situations pertinent to that domain.100  
 
might also apply to those contemporary “weapons” and “means” used in cyber operations. 
Some have also viewed the transmission of information in the neutral State’s cyber infra-
structure as something akin to physical transportation of those weapons, though this is not 
without controversy, as some consider that malware cannot be equated with either weapons 
or munitions. See, e.g., TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 6, at 452, 557–78; Biller & Schmitt, 
supra note 50, at 192–95; U.S. DOD MANUAL, supra note 3, § 16.4.1 n.44; von Heinegg, 
Territorial Sovereignty and Neutrality in Cyberspace, supra note 39, at 148. These discussions, how-
ever, are outside the scope of the article. 
96. HC-XIII, supra note 14, art. 10. See also id. art. 12 (generally prohibiting belligerent 
warships from “remain[ing] in the ports, roadsteads, or territorial waters of the said Power 
for more than twenty-four hours”). 
97. Although HC-XIII does not specifically address the possibility of transferring mu-
nitions, warships, by their nature, carry weapons systems. 
98. 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, ¶ 325. Note, however, that some commentators rely 
on the “silence” of the law in the sea domain and attempt to settle this inconsistency by 
assuming that the prohibition on land also extends to the sea. See Biller & Schmitt, supra 
note 50, at 192. 
99. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 6, at 554, ¶ 4. See also James Kraska, The Law of 
Maritime Neutrality and Submarine Cables, EJIL:TALK! (July 29, 2020), https://www.ejil 
talk.org/the-law-of-maritime-neutrality-and-submarine-cables/. 
100. Such as passage through neutral waters or docking at neutral ports. See Vagts, supra 











Nevertheless, it remains unclear which set of rules would be more suita-
ble to draw analogies from in the cyber context. If States adopt the rule per-
taining to the land domain as the legal framework governing this scenario, 
belligerent States would arguably be required to verify that a certain cyber-
attack, and the data packets it consists of, does not pass through servers lo-
cated in the territory of a neutral State in order to avoid breaching the neu-
trality of other States. However, from a practical point of view, since data 
packets would most likely travel through neutral State servers on their way 
to the target State, adopting such an approach may result in the law of neu-
trality being regularly (and perhaps unwittingly) violated by belligerents. Ac-
cepting this conclusion may therefore undermine the continued relevance of 
this legal regime.101 
Let us now consider the implications of adopting Article 10 HC-XIII, 
pertaining to the sea domain, to govern the scenario. Doing so raises a dif-
ferent set of compatibility questions. For warships, navigation routes are not 
limitless, and some territorial waters may even form part of “highways for 
international traffic,” the passage through which cannot be prohibited.102 In 
the cyber domain, as mentioned, data packets travel through multiple serv-
ers, and while they can be re-routed to pass through other servers, they will 
most likely have to pass through servers located in neutral States.103  
Thus, on the one hand, a comparison between the transmission of data 
in cyberspace to navigation in the sea domain may be appealing given the 
relatively expansive freedom of passage available in the latter and the bor-
derless nature of the former.104 On the other hand, substantial differences 
between the two remain, such as the considerably greater ability to monitor 
navigation of vessels at sea, the speed at which such navigation takes place, 
and the significantly easier ability to attribute naval activity to particular 
States. Given the limitations arising from the application of both the land 
and sea domain rules, the uncertainty remains. 
 
101. It may presumably also lead to the escalation of existing armed conflicts, since 
breaches of neutrality may lead to enforcement actions (taken either by belligerent or neutral 
States), thus drawing more States into the conflict. See, e.g., Joshua Kastenberg, Non-Interven-
tion and Neutrality in Cyberspace: An Emerging Principle in the National Practice of International Law, 
64 AIR FORCE LAW REVIEW 43, 56 (2009). However, it should be recalled that the law on 
the use of force imposes further obligations in this regard. See discussion supra Part II. 
102. 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, ¶ 325. See also 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: A TREATISE: PEACE ¶ 188 (2d ed. 1912). 
103. See, e.g., Kraska, supra note 99. 











What complicates matters even further is that different possible analo-
gies may be drawn even within the same domain of warfare. For example, 
with respect to the land domain, in addition to the possible application of 
Article 2 of HC-V to this scenario, it may likewise be possible to apply Article 
8 of HC-V, according to which “the use on behalf of the belligerents of 
telegraph or telephone cables or of wireless telegraphy apparatus belonging 
to it or to companies or private individuals” is not prohibited.105 
A mutatis mutandis application of Article 8 to our scenario could lead to 
the Internet being regarded as analogous to the aforementioned communi-
cation networks.106 Accordingly, the use by belligerent State A of neutral 
State C’s publicly accessible Internet servers to transmit data from its terri-
tory to State B—even if such data contains malware and is part of a cyber-
attack that causes physical damage—would not be deemed a violation of 
State C’s neutrality.107 
This application of Article 8 may seem practical at first blush. However, 
such an approach has its limits, as it may be seen as carrying far-reaching 
consequences. Namely, if data passing through the cyber domain were 
viewed as a form of communication (as this term is understood under Article 
8), irrespective of whether such data constitutes a cyber-attack, the transmis-
sions would not be prohibited by the law of neutrality. Given the considera-
ble support for the position that views the cyber domain as a separate theater 
of warfare,108 it remains to be seen whether States will, in fact, support an 
approach that presumably may involve dispensing with the law of neutrality 
altogether in this regard.  
 
2. Relaying Information via a “CERT” Network 
 
State C has a governmental computer emergency response team (CERT) 
tasked with information sharing and cyber incident response, protecting 
 
105. HC-V, supra note 14, art. 8. 
106. See, for instance, COMMENTARY TO THE HPCR MANUAL, supra note 16, at 309; 
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 6, at 556–57; von Heinegg, Territorial Sovereignty and Neu-
trality in Cyberspace, supra note 39, at 148–49; U.S. DOD MANUAL, supra note 3, § 16.4.1. 
However, applying Article 8, as suggested, to the cyber domain is not without difficulty. See, 
e.g., Kraska, supra note 99; von Heinegg, supra note 39, at 149 (discussing lack of relevant 
State practice in support of such an interpretation). 
107. U.S. DOD MANUAL, supra note 3, § 16.4.1. 











both public and private entities within the State.109 This CERT is part of a 
network of national CERTs, from multiple States, that regularly shares real-
time information about international cybersecurity risks. State A also has a 
national CERT that is part of the same network. 
Following the outbreak of the armed conflict between States A and B, 
neutral State C’s CERT receives information regarding a potential cyber-at-
tack aimed at military cyberinfrastructure in State A. In accordance with its 
normal course of action within the inter-governmental network, State C re-
lays the information it receives throughout the entire CERT network. Based 
on the information it shares, State A thwarts the cyber-attack, evidently car-
ried out by State B as part of the armed conflict between them. 
As explained above, the law of neutrality imposes a duty on the neutral 
State to refrain from participating in the conflict. This obligation is reflected, 
inter alia, in the prohibition to “supply, in any manner, directly or indirectly, 
by a neutral Power to a belligerent Power, of war-ships, ammunition, or war 
material of any kind whatever” as set forth in Article 6 of HC-XIII regarding the 
sea domain.110 Thus, under this scenario, the provision of information by 
State C regarding State B's cyber-attack may perhaps be equated, mutatis mu-
tandis, with the provision of “war material of any kind whatever,”111 as this 
 
109. CERTs (sometimes referred to as CSIRTs or CIRTs) monitor, collect, and analyze 
information regarding cyber-security incidents in order to identify and react to cyber-secu-
rity threats. These teams can be governmental, public (such as academic), or privately-run, 
while one network can include actors from several sectors, which share information and 
best-practices. Several States have more than one CERT operating within their territory. See 
generally Peter Sullivan, Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), WHATIS.COM – TECH-
TARGET, https://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/CERT-Computer-Emergency-Readi-
ness-Team (last visited Apr. 5, 2021); John Haller, Samuel Merrell, Matthew Butkovic & 
Bradford Willke, Best Practices for National Cyber Security: Building a National Computer Security 
Incident Management Capability, Version 2.0, SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INSTITUTE 1 (April 
2011), https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/asset_files/TechnicalReport/2011_005_001_15401. 
pdf [hereinafter SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INSTITUTE]; FIRST Members Around the World, 
FIRST, https://www.first.org/members/map (last visited July 29, 2020); CSIRTs by Country 
– Interactive Map, EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR CYBERSECURITY, https://www.enisa.eu-
ropa.eu/topics/csirts-in-europe/csirt-inventory/certs-by-country-interactive-map (last vis-
ited Apr. 2, 2021). 
110. HC-XIII, supra note 14, art. 6 (emphasis added). A similar prohibition can be found 
in Hague Rules of Air Warfare supra note 15, art. 44. 
111. HC-XIII, supra note 14, art. 6. See, e.g., 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, ¶ 356. See also 
David A. Willson, An Army View of Neutrality in Space: Legal Options for Space Negation, 50 AIR 
FORCE LAW. REVIEW 175, 194, 199–200 (2001); Tess Bridgeman, The Law of Neutrality and 











information allowed State A to thwart an attack planned against it.112 Under 
this analogy, State C would be in violation of its neutrality obligation under 
Article 6 of HC-XIII. 
However, such a conclusion runs the risk of undermining the operation 
of inter-governmental CERT networks altogether, as these networks rely on 
a high degree of cooperation and transparency between their members, who 
work towards a common goal and rapidly respond to threats.113 As dozens 
of States take part in such networks,114 requiring them to either refrain from 
sharing information regarding a cyber threat or thoroughly investigate the 
source of every threat in order to make sure that relaying such information 
would not violate their neutrality obligations may be an onerous demand. As 
a result, there seems to be an inherent contradiction between taking an active 
part in a CERT network and the ability to remain neutral. Given the fact that 
CERTs have become commonplace in the international system, such an in-
terpretation of the law of neutrality appears both undesirable and impracti-
cal.  
The following example demonstrates some of the complexities that may 
arise even when the impugned actions are not those of the neutral State but 
rather of commercial service providers operating from a neutral State’s ter-
ritory.  
 
3. A “Web Application Firewall” Service Operating from a Neutral 
Territory  
 
State A protects its military website dedicated to recruiting reserve-duty sol-
diers through a privately-owned “web application firewall” (WAF) service, 
the servers of which are located in the territory of neutral State C. A WAF is 
“a firewall that monitors, filters and blocks data packets as they travel to and 
 
112. See, e.g., U.S. DOD MANUAL, supra note 3, § 15.3.2.1 (similarly holding that “[a] 
neutral State also has a duty to refrain from placing its various governmental agencies at the 
disposal of a belligerent in such a way as to aid it directly or indirectly in the prosecution of 
the war”). 
113. SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INSTITUTE, supra note 109, at 14, 18. 
114. According to the ITU, as of March 2019, there were 109 National CIRTs. See, 
National CIRT, ITU, https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Cybersecurity/Pages/national-CIRT. 
aspx (last visited Apr. 2, 2021). For further information regarding particular CERT net-
works, see, e.g., CSIRTs Network, ENISA, https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/csirts-in-
europe/csirts-network (last visited Apr. 2, 2021) (for information on the European CSIRTS 
Network); FIRST Teams, FIRST, https://www.first.org/members/teams/ (last visited Apr. 











from a website or web application”115 for the purpose of protecting that 
website from malicious activities, including distributed denial-of-service 
(DDOS) attacks.116  
State B wishes to shutdown State A’s website in order to prevent the 
recruitment of the additional troops needed to reinforce the frontlines in the 
international armed conflict. To do so, State B demands that State C disable 
the WAF provider’s service, which originates from State C’s territory. 
As discussed, neutral States must prevent belligerents from pursuing var-
ious hostile acts from their territory. Thus, in the sea domain, Article 25 of 
HC-XIII provides that a neutral State “is bound to exercise such surveillance 
as the means at its disposal allow to prevent any violation of the provisions 
. . . occurring in its ports or roadsteads or in its waters,”117 including “any act 
which would, if knowingly permitted by any Power, constitute a violation of 
neutrality.”118 Regarding the air domain, Article 47 of the Hague Rules of Air 
Warfare provides that a neutral State “is bound to take such steps as the 
means at its disposal permit to prevent within its jurisdiction aerial observa-
tion of the movements, operations or defenses of one belligerent, with the 
intention of informing the other belligerent.”119 
The use of WAF services, the servers of which are located in a neutral 
State’s territory, can arguably be deemed a violation of neutrality under Ar-
ticle 25 of HC-XIII. More specifically, it may be equated with an observation 
of operations with the intention of benefiting one of the belligerents. These 
assumptions would presumably give rise to an obligation by State C to pre-
vent the provision of WAF services from its territory as part of the armed 
conflict. 
However, applying a different set of rules which appears in both HC-V 
and HC-XIII may lead to an opposite result, especially given that the service 
State B seeks to disable is provided by a private entity. Article 7 of HC-V 
 
115. Ben Lutkevich, Web Application Firewall (WAF), SEARCHSECURITY.TECHTARGET, 
https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/Web-application-firewall-WAF (last vis-
ited Apr. 5, 2021). 
116. This service is often provided by private companies, to clients from the private, 
governmental and public sector. See id. 
117. HC-XIII, supra note 14, art. 25. Similarly, in the land domain, HC-V requires that 
neutral States “not allow any of the acts referred to in Articles 2 to 4 to occur on its terri-
tory,” such as the movement of, inter alia, “munitions of war or supplies” across its territory. 
HC-V, supra note 14, art. 5. 
118. HC-XIII, supra note 14, art. 1; see also SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL 
LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA ¶ 15 (Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995). 











provides that “[a] neutral Power is not called upon to prevent the export or 
transport, on behalf of one or other of the belligerents, of arms, munitions 
of war, or, in general, of anything which can be of use to an army or a 
fleet.”120 Similarly, Article 7 of HC-XIII states that “[a] neutral Power is not 
bound to prevent the export or transit, for the use of either belligerent . . . 
of anything which could be of use to an army or fleet.”121 Both conventions 
require that if the neutral State does apply any such measure, such application 
must be carried out impartially towards all belligerents.122   
Insofar as the WAF service can be equated to something “which can be 
of use to an army or a fleet” and the provision of such service to State A can 
be considered as “transport” or “transit” of the commercial service,123 then 
State C would not be required to disable it or prevent its “transport” in any 
way, as long as it does not prevent State B from accessing that service as 
well.124 
 
120. HC-V, supra note 14, art. 7. 
121. HC-XIII, supra note 14, art. 7. See also Hague Rules of Air Warfare, supra note 15, 
art. 45, cmt. at 37. 
122. HC-V, supra note 14, art. 9. While the wording of Article 9 of HC-XIII seems to 
be more limited, the preamble of the Convention nevertheless confirms that the principle 
of impartiality is applicable to measures undertaken pursuant to Article 7 of HC-XIII as 
well. See also 1 THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, THE CONFER-
ENCE OF 1907: PLENARY MEETINGS OF THE CONFERENCE 295 (James Brown Scott ed., 
1920) [hereinafter 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES]; Seger, supra 
note 7, at 256. 
123. The travaux préparatoires of HC-V provide several indications that could be regarded 
as supporting the plausibility of drawing such an analogy. For instance, it is submitted that 
while Article 2 of the Convention is addressed to the belligerents themselves, Article 7 “re-
fers only to commercial enterprises of individuals.” Additionally, the travaux of Article 7 
specifically state that the drafters deliberately chose wording broader than just the term “ex-
port,” and that “the Commission adopted the more general text, embracing the transport as 
well as the export and making no mention of the nationality of the merchants interested . . 
. .” See 1 THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 122, at 138, 
141, respectively. See also U.S. DOD MANUAL, supra note 3, § 15.3.2.1; Willson, supra note 
111, at 194. However, this possibility is put forth notwithstanding the intricate question of 
whether arms control regimes and the practice of legal inter-State arms trade, including 
when done through private corporations, have further modified the law of neutrality, which 
is outside the scope of this article. See generally Nasu, supra note 4, at 8–9, 13–14. 
124. A similar conclusion may be reached when applying Article 8 of HC-V to this 
scenario. Under this Article a neutral State “is not called upon to forbid or restrict the use 
on behalf of the belligerents of telegraph or telephone cables or of wireless telegraphy ap-












Consequently, if State C refrains from disabling the WAF service, the 
question of whether State C breached its neutrality obligation would seem to 
depend on the choice of analogy. Again, this results in a high degree of un-
certainty as to what rules are—or should be—applicable to such scenarios. 
In addition to the legal ambiguity, adopting the first possible application, 
whereby the neutral State is obligated to prevent the WAF service, may raise 
practical difficulties. WAF and similar services provided by private actors are 
commonly used by multiple clients, including governmental ones.125 This 
would presumably require private corporations to constantly monitor their 
governmental clients’ activities, as well as their international affairs, and, in 
turn, require neutral States to monitor these corporations’ activities in this 
regard.126  
Moreover, as a matter of policy, there is a question of whether neutrality 
rules should be applied in a manner that mandates States to interfere with 
Internet services provided from their territory, thus conceivably challenging 
the decentralized nature of the cyber domain on the one hand,127 and perhaps 
contradicting one of the foundational notions of the law of neutrality—the 
preservation of free commerce despite ongoing armed conflicts—on the 
other.128 
Adopting the second possible application—by using an analogy to Arti-
cle 7 of HC-V and HC-XIII—again, may undermine the relevance of the 
 
mutandis application of this Article may equate the Internet to these communication net-
works, and, since the WAF service is also provided by a private company, the neutral State 
would not be under any obligation to prevent the communications of WAF services from 
its territory. 
125. Mordor Intelligence, Web Application Firewall Market - Growth, Trends, COVID-19 





racuda+Networks%2c+and+Imperva&utm_exec=joca220prd. One WAF provider de-
scribes its services as delivered “from a physical presence in 200 cities across over 100 coun-
tries. This means threats are mitigated close to where they originate, not in your data center.” 
See Web Application Firewall, CLOUDFLARE, https://www.cloudflare.com/waf/ (last visited 
Apr. 2, 2021). For an example of the diverse clientele of such services, see, e.g., Case Studies, 
IMPERVA, https://www.imperva.com/resources/customers/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2021). 
126. See, e.g., U.S. DOD MANUAL, supra note 3, § 16.4.1; OSLO MANUAL RULES AND 
COMMENTARY, supra note 22, r. 32 cmt., at 27. 
127. In this regard, see von Heinegg, Neutrality in Cyberspace, supra note 5, at 43. 











law of neutrality, as described in the first scenario: belligerent States could 
regularly use private cyber services available in neutral States, while neutral 
States might rely on the fact that belligerent cyber activities in their territory 
are carried out through private corporations to justify their inaction.129 
 
B. Challenges Arising from a Mutatis Mutandis Application 
 
The scenarios described above are non-exhaustive illustrations of how the 
application of the law of neutrality, mutatis mutandis, in the cyber domain is 
fraught with interpretative difficulties and can lead in certain cases to coun-
ter-productive results. This Section will address some of the broader issues 
arising from these and similar scenarios by highlighting three challenges aris-
ing from attempts to draw analogies from neutrality rules in the physical do-
mains to cyberspace: (1) the legal uncertainty created; (2) practical difficulties 
in applying the law of neutrality; and (3) policy questions relating to the de-
sirability of such application. 
 
1. Legal Uncertainty 
 
The above scenarios have shown that applying traditional neutrality rules to 
cyberspace can lead to contradictory outcomes when relying on analogies—
both between different domains and even within the same domain. This may 
be due, inter alia, to the fact that the intangible nature of the cyber domain 
presumably allows for several possible analogies between particular cyber 
activities to situations in the physical realm: data can flow like a ship through 
the high seas, it communicates messages as does wireless telegraphy, and 
requires physical infrastructure for its carriage. This is understandable in light 
of the fact that neutrality rules applicable to the physical domains were not 
designed with the cyber domain in mind. 
Whatever the reason for these contradictions, their main consequence is 
that the suggestion that existing neutrality rules could apply mutatis mutandis 
to the cyber context still creates a great deal of legal uncertainty, and States 
are in no better position to ascertain which rules apply to which scenarios. 
In this sense, the mutatis mutandis approach has not advanced our understand-
ing in any clear-cut manner. 
 
 











2. Practical Difficulties 
 
Even if the challenge of identifying the relevant legal rule is overcome, a 
mutatis mutandis application of neutrality rules to the cyber domain may fur-
ther encounter significant practical difficulties. As discussed earlier, a certain 
reality already exists in cyberspace, both in terms of which stakeholders are 
involved in shaping the domain, and their behavior within it. Cyber infra-
structure is scattered throughout the globe with almost no territorial limita-
tions, and even the simplest cyber activities and services may frequently in-
volve both State actors and private entities. 
The scenarios above illustrate that in light of the ways in which data is 
transmitted, the fact that cyberspace is built with no regard to national bor-
ders (as they are understood in the physical world), and the question of what 
would be considered as under the responsibility or jurisdiction of the State 
is unclear, States confronted with similar scenarios would face a host of dif-
ficulties in implementing neutrality rules. The lack of control over both 
transmissions and their content, as well as over the private corporations who 
own and operate online services, is inherently at odds with the law of neu-
trality, which assumes that States have control over their respective jurisdic-
tions.  
Thus, application of the law of neutrality could potentially mean that 
either States risk being in breach of the law of neutrality at any given mo-
ment, or that the manner in which States and other stakeholders currently 
behave in, and use, cyberspace must undergo significant adaptations (for ex-
ample, radically increasing State control over Internet traffic, changing rout-
ing protocols, unencrypting data packets, and the like). This raises the ques-
tion of whether such demands would be practicable. 
 
3. A Question of Policy 
 
The scenarios described above, and the possible application of certain neu-
trality rules to them, also seem to raise several policy concerns. Some of the 
potential applications of the neutrality rules presented above resulted in con-
sequences that run counter to certain underlying rationales of the law of neu-
trality, such as the prevention of escalation of conflicts and the preservation 
of free trade despite armed conflicts. Accepting some of the other sugges-
tions resulted in a possible erosion of the law of neutrality due to the ques-
tionable practicality of applying particular provisions in the current cyber-











Similarly, as a matter of policy, there is a question of whether the appli-
cation of certain neutrality rules would be compatible with the decentralized 
nature of cyberspace governance or with (at least certain) States’ desire to 
keep it decentralized. Essentially, a more rigid application of some traditional 
neutrality rules requires that States exert more control over cyberspace, its 
architecture, and modes of domestic and international governance. 
As these concerns exhibit, insofar as the notion that the law of neutrality 
applies in cyberspace is upheld, even mutatis mutandis, States may at times be 
in the precarious position whereby they need to decide, effectively, whether 
they prefer to conserve the cyber domain in its current form, risk the erosion 
of neutrality as a legal regime due to perceived impracticality and diminished 
compliance, or undermine its core rationales, as the case may be. 
The tensions that arise from the scenarios described, relating both to the 
policy interests inherent to the law of neutrality and policy interests relating 
to the cyber domain as a whole, point to a broader question of whether such 
application is in fact desirable.  
 
VI. NEUTRALITY AND CYBERSPACE: THE WAY FORWARD 
 
The analysis in the previous Part highlighted the main obstacles on the legal, 
practical, and policy levels created when attempting to draw analogies in or-
der to apply the law of neutrality to particular scenarios arising in the cyber 
domain. This Part will suggest where the discussion regarding the law of 
neutrality in cyberspace can focus going forward. 
First, as a matter of principle, if the law of neutrality is to be applied to 
the cyber domain, then a careful consideration of the status of each and every 
norm must be undertaken. The experts who drafted the Tallinn Manual 2.0 
were also mindful of this need.130 This careful consideration is warranted in 
light of the material differences between the cyber domain and the domains 
for which neutrality rules were originally formulated; the time that has 
elapsed since that formulation; and the fact that, as demonstrated above, acts 
in the cyber domain may be interpreted in different ways and thus equated 
with various neutrality rules, leading to different and possibly contradictory 
outcomes.  
Such a careful, norm-specific assessment can be carried out, for instance, 
by focusing on concepts that do not inherently change from one domain to 
another. These concepts may have either physical or non-physical elements. 
 











For example, neutrality rules in the land, sea, and air domain all require 
that the neutral State prevent belligerents physically present in its territory 
from conducting attacks. This rule can be applied in a straightforward man-
ner in the cyber domain to hackers of a belligerent State operating from 
within the neutral State.131 In this sense, a view according to which the cyber-
attack can be equated with a kinetic attack carried out by any other military 
squadron that deploys an attack from neutral territory is plausible. 
Other concepts that do not change from one domain to another may be 
behavioral ones, which do not necessarily rely on physical manifestation. For 
instance, the prohibition “to supply, in any manner . . . war material of any 
kind whatever”132 could potentially be interpreted as encompassing the pro-
vision of money or loans to belligerent States.133 Insofar as this interpretation 
is deemed acceptable, it would be reasonable to consider that the transfer of 
money is conduct that remains the same regardless of domain. Thus, such a 
prohibition would equally apply to the provision of cash as it would to digital 
transfers.   
Concepts that do not inherently change in each and every domain might 
also be based on broader overarching principles that appear in the law of 
neutrality. A prominent candidate for such a concept is impartiality.134 How-
ever, as the neutrality rules discussed above demonstrate, broader neutrality 
principles often have different manifestations in different domains. As a re-
sult, and bearing in mind the unique characteristics of the cyber domain, the 
possible application of these principles to cyberspace must be cautiously 
considered, taking into account only those that apply in a similar fashion in 
the other domains,135 and only if the rationale behind such application is not 
altered by the unique characteristics of the contemporary practice in cyber-
space. Thus, for example, it could be argued that to remain impartial, if a 
 
131. This act presumably violates the obligation “to abstain, in neutral territory or neu-
tral waters, from any act which would, if knowingly permitted by any Power, constitute a 
violation of neutrality.” See HC-XIII, supra note 14, art. 1.  
132. HC-XIII, supra note 14, art. 6. 
133. U.S. DOD MANUAL, supra note 3, § 15.3.2.1. This Manual relies on a specific pro-
vision in the Havana Convention in this regard. See also HC-V, supra note 14, art. 18(a). 
134. See, e.g., HC-V, supra note 14, art. 9. See, in this regard, the U.S. DoD Manual’s 
discussion of impartiality. U.S. DOD MANUAL, supra note 3, § 15.3.2; See also von Heinegg, 
Territorial Sovereignty and Neutrality in Cyberspace, supra note 39, at 144. 
135. For example, Article 7 of HC-V, supra note 14, Article 7 of HC-XIII, supra note 
14, and Article 45 of the Hague Rules of Air Warfare, supra note 15, all state that a neutral 












neutral State imposes restrictions on privately-owned banks providing cryp-
tocurrency loans to one belligerent State, it must do so towards the other 
belligerent as well.  
Looking at the broader picture, a breakthrough in understanding the law 
of neutrality in the cyber domain can only be achieved by pointing the spot-
light back to States. This would consist of discerning the legal significance 
of their actual practice in the cyber domain and examining their public ex-
pressions concerning military activities in cyberspace. While this is admit-
tedly a long-term approach, it is critical to achieving a sound understanding 
of the law of neutrality in cyberspace. 
As noted above, it is currently difficult to ascertain that there is sufficient 
State practice to identify customary neutrality rules that apply in the cyber 
domain. At the same time, States’ activities within the cyber domain have 
also gradually evolved over the years, and, as the analysis in the previous Part 
makes plain, this practice is not fully compatible with neutrality rules.  
Yet, States’ current practice in the cyber domain must be considered 
when examining which rules are regarded as applicable, as this is perhaps the 
most significant indication of how States view the relationship between cy-
berspace and the law of neutrality. Moreover, while an examination of State 
practice may also be indicative of their opinio juris, it would not necessarily 
suffice for reaching a conclusive determination in this regard.136 As men-
tioned above, so far, many States have voiced their position that international 
law applies in cyberspace. Still, only a few States have expressly indicated that 
they view the law of neutrality as applicable in the cyber domain. To deter-
mine whether States have a sense of obligation to apply and comply with 
specific neutrality rules in cyberspace, States must clearly voice their posi-
tions. This would be an essential first step in elucidating the current legal 
ambiguity and inconsistent practice.137  
 
136. See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
1996 I.C.J Rep. 226, ¶¶ 64–72, 96 (July 8); ILC CIL Report, supra note 71, at 127, 141. 
137. Hollis and his co-authors aptly highlighted this point:  
 
In the absence of a treaty, an accepted treatise or concrete applications in practice, 
states have begun to make individual “national statements” on the subject. Since 2018, sev-
eral states have issued such statements. With the exceptions of Australia and the United 
States, most are European, and include Estonia, France, Germany, the Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom. The UN General Assembly has encouraged participants in the cur-
rent UN Group of Governmental Experts to issue statements, and various contributions to 
the parallel UN Open Ended Working Group touch on the subject. Yet, the application of 












While these may seem to be obvious steps, they are often overlooked in 
the discourse on the applicability of the law of neutrality to cyberspace. Yet, 
given the challenges discussed at length throughout this article, getting “back 
to basics” may actually provide the best course of action to bridge the gap 
between the law of neutrality on the one hand and the reality of how States 




This article examined whether the law of neutrality applies to cyberspace and 
what such an application would entail. It found that it is difficult to ascertain 
that the lex lata supports the applicability of the law of neutrality to cyber-
space, given that there are no relevant treaty provisions, and that there is 
insufficient State practice and opinio juris to conclude that customary rules of 
neutrality have crystallized in the cyber domain. The article then addressed 
the problems with relying on analogies for the purposes of the application 
of the law of neutrality to cyberspace. This analysis established that beyond 
general statements referring to the applicability of international law in the 
cyber domain, there must be a careful examination of the shape such ap-
plicability takes.  
Therefore, the article pointed to possible directions in identifying aspects 
of the law of neutrality that are nevertheless relevant in cyberspace. These 
include a cautious norm-specific examination in each case and reaching con-
clusions regarding the lex lata based on the actual practice of States, as it 
manifests in cyberspace. The inquiry undertaken in this article has high-
lighted the need for States to further express their views: not only as to the 
applicability of international legal regimes in cyberspace but also on the ac-
tual implementation of their specific rules.  
Of course, the analysis and conclusions presented in this article are not 
necessarily unique to the law of neutrality. As such, the proposed approach 
 
rely primarily on European contributions (or contributions by those states with the greatest 
cyber capabilities). As the European Union itself has emphasised, all states should have the 
opportunity—and indeed be encouraged—to delineate and describe their respective posi-
tions on how international law operates in the digital environment. Simply put, states need 
additional opportunities and fora to develop and issue their understandings of the relevant 
international legal issues.  
 
Hollis, Vila & Rakhlina-Powsner, Elaborating International Law for Cyberspace, supra note 
85. See also Schmitt & Watts, supra note 74 (calling for more States to express their opinio juris 











may very well be useful in assessing the applicability of other legal regimes 
to the cyber domain as well. 
